REMUNERATION OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

MIROSLAV NEDELCHEV

 

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to present the development stages of the executive directors' remuneration. The focus is on the components of remuneration and, to a lesser extent, on its value. The executive directors are the object of paper.
The results of the paper set ten stages for the period 1910-2100's. The dynamics of remuneration reflects the social expectations of a correlation between the results achieved and the compensation of the executive directors. A good structured remuneration policy reduces agency conflict by aligning the agent and principal interests by offering shares and stock options.

Key words

corporate governance, principal-agent, remuneration

JEL Codes: G34, H32

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